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R ecent theoretical research on the overall economic effects of oil revenues on economic growth indicates that their net impact 
may well be much less than originally an-
ticipated. Specifically, government domes-. 
tic expenditure of oil revenues inevitably 
leads to real exchange-rate appreciation. 
Exchange-rate appreciation or the so-called 
"Dutch disease" should ultimately result in 
a contraction in the non-oil export sector 
with inflation and expansion taking place in 
the non-traded-goods sector. 
As Al-Sabah notes 1 the Dutch disease is 
not unique to oil-exporting countries, but 
has occurred in a variety of environments: 
1. The national gas discoveries in the 
Netherlands in the 1960s led to an appreci-
ation in the real exchange rate, brought 
about not so much by an appreciation in the 
nominal exchange rate as by nominal wage 
increases ahead of those of West Germany, 
with the net result that her export industries 
1Mohammad Al-Sabah, "The 'Dutch Disease' in an 
Oil Exporting Country: Kuwait," OPEC Review 
(Summer 1988), p. 129. 
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were squeezed and a decline in Dutch man-
ufacturing set in. 
2. The boom in technologically advanced 
parts of Japan's manufacturing sector in the 
1960s had adverse effects on the less dy-
namic tradable sectors, including agricul-
ture. 
3. The boom in the export of Swiss bonds 
and money in the 1970s led to a real appre-
ciation in the Swiss franc and had an ad-
verse effect on traditional Swiss exports 
and export-competing industries. 
Given the varying structures of devel-
oped and developing countries, one would 
anticipate the manufacturing sector to con-
tract in advanced countries, while the agri-
cultural sector would be most severely af-
fected in developing countries.2 This stems 
in part from the fact that most developing 
ofl-exporting countries, particularly the 
smaller countries in the Persian Gulf area, 
had negligible industrial output before the 
2Nancy C. Benjamin, Shantayanan Devarajan, and 
Robert J. Weiner, "Oil Revenues and the 'Dutch 
Disease' in a Developing Country: Cameroon," OPEC 
Review (Summer 1986), p. 143. 
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1973-74 oil boom, and were not exporters of 
industrial products. 
In fact, in their pursuit of an active indus-
trial policy most of the Gulf governments 
have attempted to use oil revenues to de-
velop a wide variety of industries. Enor-
mous subsidies such as cheap energy, sub-
sidized imported inputs and low real inter-
est rates on loans, tax holidays and non-
nominal rents on industrial sites have all 
been financed out of oil revenues. Given 
the lack of an initial industrial base, appre-
ciating currency by reducing the cost of 
imports of capital and intermediate goods 
could provide a net subsidy rather than a 
cost to indigenous manufacturers. This may 
be particularly relevant to Saudi Arabia, 
where one of the main inputs to industrial 
production - workers - are largely for-
eign and therefore essentially imports. The 
same applies to other "tradable" sectors. 
A priori, therefore, it is impossible to draw 
any conclusions as to whether the Dutch 
disease has been a major obstacle to the 
development of manufacturing in newly in-
dustrializing oil-exporting countries. 
The purpose of this paper3 is to examine 
the effects of exchange appreciation on a 
major oil exporter: Saudi Arabia. In partic-
ular, we are interested in determining 
whether the exchange-rate appreciation as-
sociated with the post-1973-74 boom in oil 
revenues has tended to stifle overall manu-
facturing output. As a basis of comparison, 
the effects of exchange appreciation on the 
other major sectors are also estimated. 
Based on the findings of this analysis, 
several conclusions are drawn concerning 
the viability of Saudi Arabian industries in 
3The quantitative results surveyed here are based on 
the analysis presented in Robert E. Looney, "Oil 
Revenues and the Dutch Disease in Saudi Arabia: 
• 
Differential Impacts on Sectoral Growth," Working 
Paper'R 
, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval 
Postgraduate School ( 1988). 
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an environment of falling oil revenues and 
an overvalued exchange rate. 
PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Since the mid- I 970s, much of the Saudi 
Arabian government's attention has cen-
tered on industrial development, primarily 
in the downstream activities of the petro-
leum sector. Joint ventures with foreign 
partners were formed to import technology 
capable of utilizing oil and gas as feedstock 
for refining and petrochemical operations. 
Major petrochemical plants are opera-
tional, and most primary production facili-
ties were completed by the end of 1985. 
With these facilities, Saudi Arabia is capa-
ble of producing between 4 and 5 percent of 
the world's primary petrochemical output. 
For purposes of classification, Saudi of-
ficials distinguish among six types of indus-
tries: 
l. Group I includes chemicals, fertilizers, 
drugs and medicine, crude-oil refining, rub-
ber products and plastic products; 
2. Group II comprises iron and steel, 
aluminum, structural metal products, and 
fabricated metal products; 
3. Group III industries include structural 
clay products, cement and cement prod-
ucts, and non-metallic mineral products; 
4. Group IV is composed of textiles, 
clothing, footwear, paper products, chi-
na ware, and glass products; 
5. Group V includes furniture, machin-
ery, equipment, consumer appliances, air 
conditioners, and motor vehicles; 
6. Group VI encompasses food products, 
bakeries, ice storage and warehousing, and 
carbonated products. 
Saudi officials characterize heavy indus-
try as primary and secondary industries; 
these designations refer both to industrial 
function and to the size of plants. The 
classification most useful for the present 
study is size of investment. Primary indus-
try refers to investments greater than $100 
million; secondary industries range from 
$20 million to $100 million, and light man-
ufacturing corresponds to investments of 
less than $20 million.4 
The new emphasis of Saudi industrializa-
tion clearly indicates that a movement 
toward highly capital-intensive operations 
is underway. In all categories, for firms 
under construction (presumably completed 
by the end of 1985) capital per worker is 
greater than for enterprises already in op-
eration (at the end of 1983). For primary 
industries in Group I, capital per worker is 
$1,051,000 for operating firms and 
$2,302,900 for firms under construction. 
For purposes of comparison, during 1976 in 
the United States, capital per worker in 
1972 dollars was $151,000 in the petroleum 
sector, $65,000 in primary metals and 
$55,000 in the chemical industry. 
In terms of employment, the 180 percent 
increase in industrial investment on new 
projects will increase the industrial labor 
force by approximately 35 percent. The 
change in emphasis from light manufac-
turing to heavy industry is primarily re-
sponsible for this relatively small increase 
in the industrial labor force. Employment in 
light manufacturing accounts for about 
three fourths of total employment for firms 
in operation but only two thirds of total 
employment for the firms under construc-
tion. 
In spite of the massive investment in 
industry, the industrial labor force will re-
main a small proportion of the total labor 
force. The Saudi labor force in the period 
between 1985 and 1990 will be between 1.8 
million and 2.0 million persons. The total 
industrial employment of approximately 
4Cf. Donald A. Wells, "The Effects of Saudi Indus-
trialization on Employment," Journal of Energy and 
Development, pp. 273-284. 
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125,000 will be about 7 percent of total 
Saudi employment. 
On the other hand, it is estimated that by 
1990 there will still be over 500,000 foreign 
workers in Saudi Arabia. More important, 
although there are no official statistics, it is 





These trends, together with several re-
cent assessments5 of Saudi industrializa-
tion, suggest the following:6 
1. Investments have been largely in 
projects seeking to utilize locally available 
raw materials. Basic industries have been 
created in isolation without the vital inter-
mediate trans-sectoral industries which in 
time might allow the growth of a self-
perpetuating industrial base. 
2. Industrial development began as a 
function of factors unrelated to the socio-
economic reality of the Kingdom. It de-
pended mainly on the need to use the flared 
associated gas and accumulating capital. As 
a result, the pace of the process of indus-
trialization was dictated by external condi-
tions and not by the needs and capabilities 
of the domestic society. This led to heavy 
dependence on foreign manpower, exper-
tise, management and technology. 
3. Sudden easy access to wealth created 
a consumer-oriented society in which the 
relationship between productivity and re-
ward largely disappeared. Many invest-
ment decisions were based on overly opti-
mistic economic assumptions. The deci-
'In particular, M. H. Nagi, "Development with 
Unlimited Supplies of Capital: The Case of OPEC," 
The Developing Economies (March 1982); and M. 
Nagi, "Dimensions of Dependency in Oil Rich 
Countries," The Arab Journal of the Social Sciences 
(October, 1986). 




Oil Shock (%) Real Exchange Rate Sectoral Growth Rates (1970-a1) 
(1975 = 100) (% per annum) 
Country 1970--75 1975--80 1970 1978 1981 Agric. Manuf. Non-Trade 
Saudi Arabia 544 168 292 104 69 5.3 6.7 15.8 
Kuwait 183 71 167 119 86 6.1 9.5 9.7 
Nigeria 73 46 117 121 89 -0.3 11.7 9.1 
Mexico 146 20 83 124 89 3.7 7.1 6.8 
Indonesia 1 60 118 117 106 4.0 13.4 10.1 
Venezuela 48 34 97 103 76 2.7 4.7 5.5 
Source: Based on Table 11.3 of Michael Roemer, "Dutch Disease in Developing Countries: Swallowing 
Bitter Medicine," in Mats Lundahl ed., The Primary Sector in Economic Development: Proceedings of 
the Seventh Arne Ryde Symposium, Frostava/len, August 29-30, 1983 (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 
243. 
Notes: 
Oil Shock = increment in nominal value of petroleum exports divided by GDP at beginning of each 
period. 
Real Exchange Rate = Index of local currency-to-dollar rate divided by the implicit GDP deflator and 
multiplied by an index of import prices. A decrease in the index represents a real appreciation. 
Non-Tradables = Construction , utilities, transport and communication, public administration and 
defense, and other services. 
sions were often speculative rather than 
based on long-term economic viability. In 
other words, technology was selected on 
the basis of extrapolated-factor endow-
ments which assumed continued high oil 
revenues, and not based on an assessment 
of the country's long-run sustainable-factor 
proportions. The post-1982 oil-revenue de-
cline significantly changed the relative-
factor proportions from those in existence 
after 1973-74. 
DUTCH DISEASE FACTORS AND 
SECTORAL OUTPUT 
It is clear that Saudi Arabian manufac-
turing has been developed on the basis of 
both foreign workers and capital equip-
ment. At the same time the government has 
offered little in the way of tariff protections. 
On the other hand, the government, 
through subsidized loans and its expanded 
level of expenditures, has reduced the costs 
of manufacturing while at the same time 
generating a net increase in overall demand 
for industrial products. Finally, there is no 
question that appreciation of the exchange 
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rate has played a role in affecting the dif-
ferential expansion of sectoral output. Dur-
ing the period 1970-1981, the exchange rate 
appreciated from 292 (1975 = 100) to 69 
while both the agricultural and manufac-
turing sectors' outputs expanded at about 
one half the rate of non-tradables (see 
Table). 
To determine the effects of government 
expenditures along with those associated 
with the Dutch Disease, an equation was 
created of the form: Output = f1govern-
ment expenditures, credit, real exchange 
rate, change in the real exchange rate]. 
Both long-run movements in the real ex-
change rate and year-to-year changes were 
included in the analysis since it was not at 
all clear from the literature which has the 
greater effect on the profitability of domes-
tic firms. Higher values for the real ex-
change rate and its change indicate devalu-
ation. 
In general, the results of this analysis 
indicate the following in the case of trad-
ables: 
I. Government expenditures and credit 
have played a major role in stimulating 
production. 
2. The problems associated with an ap-
preciating exchange rate, the Dutch dis-
ease, have tended to reduce output. This 
applies to both long- and short-run move-
ments in the case of agriculture, mining and 
refining, and shorter-run movements in the 
case of non-oil manufacturing. 
In short, oil revenues have tended to 
work somewhat at cross purposes for the 
general class of tradables. On the expendi-
ture side, oil revenues have been converted 
into both effective demand and available 
credit that would obviously not have been 
present otherwise. 
On the other hand, the competitive ef-
fects associated with exchange apprecia-
tion have apparently tended to offset any 
cost-reducing effects stemming from lower-
cost imports of capital, intermediate goods 
and labor. Here, however, non-oil manu-. 
facturing presents an interesting exception, 
in that the longer-run effects associated 
with the Dutch disease have tended to net 
out, leaving only shorter-run negative im-
pacts stemming from appreciation in the 
real exchange rate. 
In the case of non-tradables a much dif-
ferent pattern has developed: 
1. With the exception of construction, 
direct government expenditures have 
played a minor role in stimulating produc-
tion. With the exception of wholesale and 
retail trade, the same applies to credit. 
2. On the other hand (again with the 
possible exception of wholesale and retail 
trade) in the short run, all of these sectors 
have received considerable stimulus 
through their higher domestic prices and 
reduced import costs associated with an 
appreciating exchange rate. 
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Two competing theories provide differing 
insights as to the appropriate policy impli-
cations suggested by the above patterns: 7 
the neo-classical model, and a Keynesian 
model. 
Neo-classical analysis assumes that to 
the extent that the government uses all or 
part of its foreign-exchange surplus for in-
ternal development, structural adjustments 
must occur to accommodate the increase in 
real income. The major effects can be bro-
ken down into spending and resource-
movement effects. Given that the govern-
ment spends its oil revenue on internal 
development and assuming that both trad-
able and non-tradable goods have positive 
income elasticities of demand, i.e., normal 
goods, then given full employment the ex-
cess demand for non-tradable goods must 
increase their price relative to tradables. 
This theory implies a real appreciation 
which induces a resource movement out of 
tradable sectors into non-tradables. At the 
same time, real appreciation shifts demand 
away from non-tradable towards tradable 
goods. The profitability and production of 
the tradable sector will be squeezed in the 
process. 
In this situation any attempt by policy-
makers to restore the competitiveness of 
the tradable sector by means of a nominal 
devaluation would be nullified by an equal 
percentage increase in domestic inflation. 
More precisely, at given nominal wages and 
prices of non-tradable goods, a devaluation 
in the exchange rate will decrease real 
wages in terms of tradable goods, thus 
stlmulating production in the tradable-
goods sector. 
The impact effect of a nominal devalua-
tion is, therefore, excess demand for labor 
7Cf. Al-Sabah, pp. 130-134 for a detailed outline of 
these approaches. The discussion that follows is based 
largely on Al-Sabah's excellent summary. 
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emerging primarily from the tradable-
goods sector, which leads to an increase in 
money wages and a reallocation of labor 
out of non-tradable goods into the tradable-
goods sector. The nominal increase in 
money wages will continue squeezing prof-
itability in the process, and thus production 
of non-tradable goods, until the excess de-
mand for labor is eliminated. 
Devaluation leads to substitution and in-
come effects on the demand side. The im-
pact of devaluation will reduce private real 
income. The reduction in real private in-
come will decrease consumption of both 
goods, and the substitution effect will de-
crease further the consumption of tradables 
(but will increase the demand for non-trad-
ables). The two forces work in the same 
direction in the tradable sector, leading to 
an excess supply of tradable goods and a 
balance-of-trade surplus, while the substi-
tution effect outweighs the income effect in 
the non-tradable sector, leading to excess 
demand in this sector. 
In the Keynesian framework, prices are 
not assumed to be as flexible as in the 
neo-classical approach, i.e., the ramifica-
tions of an oil boom do not necessarily 
result in changes in relative prices or in real 
wage rates. In other words, the general 
equilibrium adjustments to a booming sec-
tor take the form of quantity rather than 
relative price adjustments. An expansion in 
the oil sector will create a balance-of-pay-
ments surplus and an increase in real in-
come. Aggregate demand increases in both 
tradable and non-tradable markets. Exce!s 
demand for tradable goods can be easily 
satisfied by an increase in imports and 
domestic tradable production. Similarly, 
excess demand in the non-tradables market 
can be eliminated by an increase in the 
production of non-tradables through the 
effective utilization of unemployed or im-
ported resources. 
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In short, the squeeze of profitability in 
the tradables sector is not an inevitable 
result of an expansion of the oil sector 
because the external surplus can be elimi-
nated, not necessarily exclusively through 
an appreciation of the exchange rate, but 
through both an increase in imports and the 
exchange rate. Furthermore, the importa-
tion of labor and capital at constant nominal 
exchange rates can aid in the expansion of 
both tradable and non-tradable goods. 
In terms of the results presented in Ta-
bles 2 and 3, together with movements in 
sectoral employment, it would seem that 
the neo-classical model best describes the 
pattern of sectoral output in Saudi Arabia. 
This is particularly evidenced by the strong 
positive stimulus to non-tradables in both 
the long and short run, and similar negative 
impacts on tradables. 
The one exception appears to be manu-
facturing, where a long-run disincentive 
does not appear to be present. This pattern 
is easily explained by the fact that the 
manufacturing sector in Saudi Arabia is 
extremely non-homogenous, with a modern 
export sector superimposed on a local more 
traditional non-traded set of activities, 
largely producing for ARAMCO and the 
construction sector (non-tradables). There 
is likely to be imperfect substitution be-
tween many of the local manufactured 
goods and imported products. Given the 
fact that the manufacturing sector com-
prises both tradables and non-tradables, 
any long-term trends in the exchange rate 
are likely to be neutral for the sector as a 
whole. 
Some Keynesian elements have been 
present, particularly those facilitating in-
creased output in both sectors through the 
massive importation of both productive in-
puts and additional tradable goods (during 
the Third Plan, 1980-85, employment in-
creased by 8.0 percent overall, with in-
creases of 7. 7 percent in producing sectors, 
and 9.8 percent in service sectors, while 
other manufacturing increased at a rate of 
17 .3 percent).s If these Keynesian effects 
were strong, we might expect the short-run 
effects of an appreciating real exchange 
rate to be minimal. The strong significance 
8Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, 
Fourth Development Plan, 1985-1990, p. 32. 
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of this term in all the regression equations 
indicates that this has not been the case. 
Given likely developments in the oil sec-
tor, and the resulting inability to import 
massive amounts of labor and capital, the 
government, burdened with an overvalued 
real exchange rate, will find it increasingly 
difficult to attain its highest priority, diver-
sification through expansion of the traded-
goods sector. 
